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Abstract
Although there is an increasing interest in examining the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and economic behavior, less is known about the relationship between cognitive
ability and social preferences. We investigate the relationship between consequential mea-
sures of cognitive ability and measures of social preferences. We have data on a series of
small-stakes dictator-type decisions, known as Social Value Orientation (SVO), in addi-
tion to choices in a larger-stakes dictator game. We also have access to the grade point
averages (GPA) and SAT (formerly referred to as the Scholastic Aptitude Test) outcomes
of our subjects. We nd that subjects who perform better on the Math portion of the SAT
are more generous in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast we nd
that subjects with a higher GPA are more selsh in the dictator game and more generous
according to the SVO. We also nd some evidence that the subjects with higher GPA
and higher SAT outcomes o¤er more consistent responses. Our results involving GPA and
social preferences complement previous work which employ measures of cognitive ability
which are sensitive to the intrinsic motivation of the subject. Our results involving SAT
scores are without precedent in the literature and suggest that measures of cognitive abil-
ity, which are less sensitive to the intrinsic motivation of the subject, are positively related
to generosity.
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1 Introduction
Researchers have made improvements in understanding behavior by conceptualizing choice
as originating from a brain which is heterogenous across subjects and inuenced by external
factors. For instance, these successes include cognitive hierarchy models (Camerer et al.,
2004; Nagel, 1995; Costa-Gomes et al., 2001), the discovery of a relationship between play in
games and the working memory capacity of the subject (Devetag and Warglien, 2003), the
nding that subjects apply similar strategies across fundamentally di¤erent games which are
played in parallel (Bednar et al., 2012, Savikhin and Sheremeta, 2012), and a relationship
between strategic sophistication and access to sleep (Dickinson and McElroy, 2010).
The benets of this conceptualization also o¤er an explanation of the subject-specic het-
erogeneity which is often found in economics experiments: subjects di¤er in their cognitive
ability.1 As an implication of this, researchers have sought to identify a relationship be-
tween measures of cognitive ability and economic behavior in the laboratory. Specically,
experiments have found that measures of cognitive ability are related to performance on a dy-
namic savings problem (Ballinger et al., 2011), learning optimal behavior in a decision problem
(Palacios-Huerta, 2003), mistakes on a forecasting task (Rydval, 2011), the complexity of the
strategies implemented in the repeated prisoners dilemma game (Jones, 2011), outcomes in
the repeated prisoners dilemma game (Jones, 2008), and choice in a beauty contest game
(Burnham et al., 2009).2
While these papers examine the relationship between cognitive ability and outcomes in
economics experiments, less is known about the relationship between cognitive ability and
social preferences. Clarifying the relationship between cognitive ability and social preferences
would seem to be useful in the interpretation of these experiments. Here we hope to shed
new light on the relationship by analyzing dictator-type allocations decisions and measures of
cognitive ability. Our measures of cognitive ability include data on grade point averages (here-
after GPA) and the national rank on the SAT.3 We refer to these measures as consequential
1For instance, see Camerer and Hogarth (1999).
2We should note that not each such study has turned up such a relationship. For instance, Georganas et
al. (2010) nd that measures of cognitive ability are poorly related to the strategic sophistication in games.
3The SAT is an entrance examination for admission as a freshman to universities in the United States.
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because they can have a large e¤ect on the subsequent life outcomes of the subject.
In our experiment, subjects make a choice in a dictator game in which it is possible to
keep $10. Our subjects also complete a nine item Social Value Orientation (hereafter SVO)
measure for smaller monetary stakes. Each of the nine items has an individualistic response,
a prosocial response, and a competitive response. The individualistic response is the one
in which the material payo¤s accruing to oneself are the largest. In other words, selecting
the individualistic choice suggests that the subject neither positively nor negatively values
material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The prosocial response is the one in which
the sum of the material payo¤s accruing to both the subject and the other subject are the
largest. In other words, selecting the prosocial response suggests that the subject positively
values the material payo¤s accruing to the other subject. The competitive response is the
one in which the di¤erence between the material payo¤s accruing to the subject and the other
subject are the largest. In other words, selecting the competitive choice suggests that the
subject negatively values material payo¤s accruing to the other subject.
We compare our measures of cognitive ability with our measures of social preferences.
We nd that higher GPA subjects are more selsh in the dictator game than are lower GPA
subjects. We also nd that subjects who performed better on the Math portion of the SAT
are more generous in the dictator game than students who performed worse. We do not
nd a relationship between the Verbal portion of the SAT and choice in the dictator game.
There is also evidence of a positive relationship between generosity in the SVO and each of
our measures of cognitive ability.
Each of the nine items contained in the SVO are nearly identical.4 As such, the coherence
of the choices on these items allows a measure of the consistency of a subject. We nd evidence
that GPA, Math SAT, and Verbal SAT are each related to the consistency of SVO choices.
Additionally, we nd some evidence that GPA is related to the consistency between the SVO
and dictator game choices. However, we do not nd evidence that consistency between the
SVO and dictator game choices are related to either portion of the SAT.
Originally, SAT was an acronym for Scholastic Aptitude Test. However, presently the letters SAT do not
denote a sequence of words.
4See Appendix C for the SVO items.
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In order to interpret the contributions of our results, it is essential to have an understanding
of the literature on the SAT and GPA measures. Although to our knowledge, there does
not exist a detailed examination of the di¤erences between the SAT and GPA measures,
there does exist helpful research. Research shows that SAT outcomes are strongly related
to incentivized measures of general intelligence. For instance, Frey and Detterman (2004)
nd a positive relationship between SAT scores and scores on the Armed Services Vocational
Aptitude Battery.5 The literature also nds a close relationship between SAT scores and
subsequent GPA in college.6 Despite this close relationship between SAT and GPA measures,
there remains variation in this relationship which can only be explained by factors other
than those related to cognitive ability. For instance, personality (Noftle and Robins, 2007;
Kappe and van der Flier, 2012), patience (Kirby et al., 2005), and self-discipline in adolescents
(Duckworth and Seligman, 2005) have been found to vary with GPA. In summary, both the
SAT and GPA outcomes provide a measure of cognitive ability, however these measures,
particularly GPA, seem to be a¤ected by factors other than cognitive ability.
Finally, we note the research on the e¤ects of rewards for cognitive tests. Research nds
that intrinsic motivation and cognitive ability are separate components to the outcomes of
tests which require cognitive e¤ort.7 In particular, Segal (2012) nds evidence that the
heterogeneously distributed intrinsic motivation to perform on tests, which require cognitive
e¤ort, a¤ects their outcomes. However, intrinsic motivation is not related to self-reported
SAT scores.
In light of this literature, our study makes the following contributions. First, to our
knowledge, we are the rst paper to examine the relationship between social preferences and
measures of cognitive ability as consequential as GPA and SAT outcomes. Second, we note
that one of our measures of cognitive ability, GPA, similar to the commonly employed unin-
centivized measures of cognitive ability, is sensitive to the intrinsic motivation of the subject.
Also similar to the existing literature, we nd that outcomes on a measure of cognitive abil-
5Also see Beaujean et al. (2006).
6See Coyle and Pillow (2008) and Coyle et al. (2011).
7For instance, see Borghans et al. (2008) and Duckworth et al. (2011).
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ity, which are a¤ected by intrinsic motivation, are associated with less generous behavior in
the dictator game and more generous behavior in the SVO. We therefore view our work as
complementary to the existing literature. Third, to the extent that SAT scores are relatively
una¤ected by the intrinsic motivation of the subjects, our results regarding the SAT outcomes
appear to be without precedent in the literature. These results suggest that when the intrinsic
motivation of the subject is removed from the measure of cognitive ability, higher cognitive
ability subjects are more generous in both the dictator game and the SVO. In other words,
it seems that the di¤erences between our results involving GPA and those involving SAT out-
comes are due to the di¤erences in the sensitivity to the intrinsic motivation of the subjects.
Finally, we nd some evidence that GPA and SAT outcomes are related to the consistency of
choices.
1.1 Related Literature
There exists a literature which examines the relationship between measures of cognitive ability
and economic preferences. However, much of the literature focuses on a di¤erent set of
preferences, such as time preferences or preferences toward risk. For instance, Frederick
(2005) reports that subjects who perform better on an IQ-type test exhibit more patience
with respect to payments over time and exhibit less risk aversion over small-stakes gambles.8
By contrast, we examine the link between social preferences and measures of cognitive ability.9
There is also a literature which examines the relationship between the consistency of
answers and measures of cognitive ability. For instance, Burks et al. (2009) nds that
IQ-type test results are related to the consistency of choices made on questions involving time
or risk preferences. Eckel (1999) nds that the GPA of the student subjects is related to the
8Also, see Benjamin et al. (2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2008), Burks et al. (2009), Cokely and Kelley
(2009), and Dohmen et al. (2010). Yang and Lester (2008) examine the characteristics of subjects, including
cognitive ability, associated with susceptibility to biases. See Hoogendoorn et al. (2012) for a novel eld
experiment regarding heterogeneity in cognitive ability.
9For more on measures of cognitive ability and susceptability to biases see Bergman et al. (2010), Hoppe
and Kusterer (2011), Liberali et al. (2012), Oechssler et al. (2009), and Stanovich and West (2008). For
more on measures of cognitive ability and play in games, see Bayer and Renou (2011), Brañas-Garza et al.
(2012), Brañas-Garza et al. (2011), Gill and Prowse (2012), Putterman et al. (2011), Rydval and Ortmann
(2004), Schnusenberg and Gallo (2011), and Thöni et al. (2012). Arruñada et al. (2012) study the relationship
between social preferences and strategic sophistication.
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consistency of choices made on questions involving risk preferences. We perform a similar
exercise and nd some evidence that GPA is related to consistency. However, we nd only
mixed evidence of a relationship between SAT outcomes and consistency.
Researchers have sought to understand the relationship between di¤erent personality fea-
tures and social preferences. For instance, Van Lange et al. (1997) nd that age, childhood
experiences, and family structure are all related to social preferences. Also, Swope et al.
(2008) nd a weak relationship between the personality traits of United States Naval Acad-
emy students and behavior in the dictator game, ultimatum game, trust game, and prisoners
dilemma game.
To our knowledge, there are only a few other papers which examine the relationship be-
tween measures of cognitive ability and social preferences.10 Brandstätter and Güth (2002)
report a negative relationship between giving in a dictator game and performance on cognitive
tests.11 Ben-Ner et al. (2004) nd a negative relationship between giving in a dictator game
and performance on the Wonderlic test of cognitive ability. Further, the authors nd that this
relationship is stronger for women than for men.12 Benjamin et al. (2012) nd a weak rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and selshness in the dictator game. These studies suggest
that selshness in the dictator game is increasing in their measures of cognitive ability.
On the other hand, Millet and Dewitte (2007), nd a positive relationship between the
Raven Progressive Matrix test of cognitive ability and altruistic behavior. Their evidence
comes from observations of choice in an expanded version of SVO. Whereas we closely follow
the SVO format of Van Lange et al. (1997), which has three responses per item (competitive,
individualistic, and prosocial), Millet and Dewitte also employ a fourth option, altruistic.
The altruistic choice is distinguished from the prosocial choice in that, while both options
10For studies which investigate the e¤ects of heterogeneous cognitive ability, as manipulated by cognitive
load, see Cornelissen et al. (2011), Du¤y and Smith (2012), Hauge et al. (2009), Roch et al. (2000), and Schulz
et al. (2011).
11Although the authors conclude that their measure of cognitive ability is not related to bargaining behavior,
on page 200, the paper reports negative correlations between their measure of cognitive ability and giving in
the dictator game (r =  0:29, p = 0:04), and expectations of the amounts given by other dictators (r =  0:34,
p = 0:01).
12On page 587, the authors report a negative relationship, signicant at 0:1, in both specications of the
pooled data. The relationship is not signicant when restricted to male subjects, however they report that
the negative relationship is signicant at 0:05 in the OLS specication for female subjects. Visser and Roelofs
(2011) report a similar result.
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yield identical amounts to the subject, the prosocial option sends an amount identical to that
obtained by the subject, whereas the altruistic choice sends an even greater amount. In other
words, the prosocial option is an even split and the altruistic option sends an even larger
amount to the other subject, without reducing the subjects own allocation. The authors nd
evidence under rank order voting on hypothetical allocations that their measure of cognitive
ability is positively related to preferences for altruism.13 However, the authors do not report
such a relationship for the prosocial choices.
In this paper, we nd that the outcome on the Math portion of the SAT is associated
with generosity on both measures of social preferences. We nd that GPA is related to
generosity on the SVO measure but related to selshness in the dictator game. Finally, we
nd a relationship between the outcome of the Verbal portion of the SAT and generosity on
the SVO measure, however we do not nd a relationship involving the dictator game.
How do our results relate to the literature examining social preferences and measures of
cognitive ability? First, to the extent that GPA outcomes are a¤ected by both cognitive
ability and intrinsic motivation, as is the case for cognitive tests with low material incentives,
then our results closely follow that found by Brandstätter and Güth (2002), Ben-Ner et al.
(2004), and Benjamin et al. (2012). Similar to these authors, we nd that giving in dictator
game is negatively related to such a measure of cognitive ability. Second, given reasonable
assumptions about the preferences of the subjects, it would seem that the Millet and Dewitte
subjects with a preference for either altruistic or prosocial preferences would be categorized
as prosocial in our setting. Hence, similar to Millet and Dewitte (2007), we nd a positive
relationship between generosity according to the SVO measure and the outcome of a measure
of cognitive ability which is relatively sensitive to intrinsic motivation. Third, to the extent
that SAT scores are not signicantly a¤ected by the intrinsic motivation of the subjects, our
results regarding the SAT outcomes seem to be without precedent in the literature. Our
results suggest that measures of cognitive ability, which are relatively una¤ected by intrinsic
motivation, are positively associated with more generous behavior in both the dictator game
and the SVO.
13James (2011) nds empirical evidence that charitable giving is increasing in cognitive ability.
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2 Data and Methodology
The choices on social preferences were obtained an experimental study initially reported in
Smith (2012). Each subject was asked for a choice in one of two forms of a dictator game. In
one treatment, the subjects were given a standard $10 dictator game. This dictator game was
presented to the subjects in $0.25 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate which
of the 41 dictator game allocations they most preferred.14 A total of 96 students enrolled in
economics classes at Rutgers University-Camden made a choice in this game. The data for
this game was collected in 5 classes of 16, 21, 39, 12, and 8 subjects.
In the other dictator game treatment, the subjects were asked for their choice in a non-
standard dictator game in which the relative allocation price was 1 to 3. In other words, the
most selsh allocation is $10 to self and $0 to other and the most generous allocation is $0
to self and $30 to other. The subjects own payo¤s were listed in $0.50 increments and the
other subjects payo¤s were listed in $1.50 increments. The subjects were directed to indicate
which of the 21 dictator game allocations they most preferred.15 A total of 90 students in
economics classes at Rutgers University-Camden made a choice in this nonstandard dictator
game. The data for this game was collected in 4 classes of 21, 42, 16, and 11 subjects.
We also measured the Social Value Orientation (SVO) of the subjects. Our specication
of SVO was adapted from Van Lange et al. (1997). The subjects were given the 9 SVO items
such that three items were listed on each of three pages. In Van Lange et al., the subjects
decided on an allocation of points which carry no nancial implications. By contrast, in our
experiment, subjects were o¤ered a conversion rate of points to money whereby the subject is
e¤ectively deciding on an allocation of a very small amount of money. Across all 9 SVO items,
the subject could keep as little as $0.94 and as much as $1.06. Also across the SVO items,
the subject could send as little as $0.19 and send as much as $0.94. The subjects were not
told these amounts, however they could be calculated with relative ease. The exchange rate
between the Van Lange et al. numbers and the monetary payment was designed to provide
only small monetary incentives.
14See Appendix A for this standard dictator game.
15See Appendix B for this nonstandard dictator game.
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Each of the nine items had an individualistic response, a prosocial response, and a compet-
itive response. The exact items and the conversion from points to money in the SVO measure
is given in Appendix C. Van Lange et al. classify a subject as prosocial, individualistic or
competitive if the subject answered six of the nine items in a particular fashion.
Although a complete discussion of the motivation of the design of Smith (2012) is beyond
the scope of this paper, we note that the experiment was designed in order to detect possible
di¤erences in behavior, as a function of the order of the completion of the dictator game and
the SVO. As such, within each dictator treatment, we also varied the order of the dictator
game and the SVO measurement. Roughly half of each class made a choice in the dictator
game then the SVO items and half answered the SVO items then made a choice in the dictator
game.
The responses on the SVO and the dictator game were entered on paper. These choices
were incentivized to the extent that one out of every four subjects within each class were paid
the actual amounts obtained. All decisions were made in the absence of feedback. In an
e¤ort to mitigate possible implicit reciprocal behavior, similar to Carpenter (2005), we employ
a triadic design whereby each dictator decides an allocation involving self and another dictator.
This other dictator does not decide on an allocation involving the original dictator but rather
on a third dictator. In particular, the subjects were told to make their allocation decisions
involving themselves ("You") and another subject ("Other1"). Another subject ("Other2")
was to make allocations involving Other2 and You. Therefore, the amount accruing to each
subject was what was kept in the You-Other1 allocation decisions plus what Other2 did not
keep in the Other2-You allocation decisions. In both the measurement of SVO and the choice
in the dictator game, the status of You, Other1 and Other2 remained xed. This description
of the triadic design was provided verbally by the same male experimenter and in written form
given to each subject. The experiment was completed in less than one hour.
The data on measures of cognitive ability were obtained from the O¢ ce of the Registrar
of Rutgers University-Camden. The registrar could locate data on the cumulative GPA for
185 of the 186 subjects. Data on SAT scores could only be located for 86 of the 186 subjects.
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The SAT scores were only available for students who were admitted as freshmen. In other
words, the SAT scores for transfer students were not available.
3 Results
3.1 Overview
In the standard dictator game, subjects kept an average of $6:11 (SD = 2:66). In the
nonstandard dictator game, subjects kept an average of $7:18 (SD = 2:83). The SVO
categorized 40:5% (75) of the subjects as prosocial, 39:5% (73) as individualistic, and 4:9%
(9) as competitive. We were not able to categorize 15:1% (28) of the subjects because they
did not select a minimum of 6 response items of a particular type. The subjects accrued an
average of $14:47 and again we note that 25% were paid the amount.
We now present an overview of the variables which we use in the analysis. The variable
SVO First obtains a value of 1 if the SVO was administered rst and 0 otherwise. The
Standard Dictator variable obtains a 1 if the standard dictator was used and 0 otherwise.
We use two measures of the amount kept in the dictator game: Dictator Kept and Dictator
Fraction Kept. The variable Dictator Kept is simply the amount kept in the dictator game.
In the case of both the standard version and the nonstandard version, this can range from
0 to 10. The variable Dictator Fraction Kept normalizes the amount of money kept in the
dictator game by the total amount of money given to both players. Obviously this amount
ranges from 0 to 1.
The variable GPA is the cumulative GPA of the student as of Fall 2009. Math SAT and
Verbal SAT variables express the national rank of these portions of the SAT. The variable
Female takes a value of 1 if the subject is female and 0 otherwise. The registrar also provided
the birthdays of the subjects. From this we calculate Age which is the number of years old
as of January 1, 2010. The variable Class indicates the last two digits of the expected year
of graduation. For instance, a student expected to graduate in 2011 would obtain a value
of 11. The Prosocial variable takes the value of the number of the 9 SVO questions which
were answered prosocially. The Classication variable obtains the value of the maximum
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of the number of questions answered either prosocially, individualistically, or competitively.
The Classication variable provides a measure of the consistency of the SVO responses. We
provide the summary statistics for these variables in Table 1.
Table 1
Summary of the variables
Variable Observations Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum
SVO First 185 0:502 0:501 0 1
Standard Dictator 185 0:514 0:501 0 1
Dictator Kept 185 6:631 2:792 0 10
Dictator Fraction Kept 185 0:583 0:277 0 1
GPA 185 3:045 0:597 0:323 4:00
Math SAT 86 48:686 19:653 4:0 74:0
Verbal SAT 86 47:116 15:681 5:0 75:0
Female 185 0:357 0:480 0 1
Age 184 22:08 5:27 17:04 60:62
Class 185 10:37 0:805 9 13
Prosocial 185 4:19 3:81 0 9
Classication 185 7:71 1:73 3 9
We note that, although we conduct the experiment in a college setting, there are several
students who are older than typical college students.16 We considered dropping these subjects
as outliers however, it was not obvious precisely which students should be excluded and we
note that the age variable is not central to our study. We also note that there are no signicant
di¤erences in the Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept, GPA, or Prosocial variables of the
subjects who have SAT data available and those who do not. Finally, we do not nd a
signicant di¤erence between the Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept, GPA, Prosocial, or
SAT variables of the subjects in each of the 9 experimental sessions.17 We also include the
covariance matrix involving our central variables.
16The ages of the subjects over 30 include: 60, 52, 42, 38, 37, 33, 32, and three instances of 31.
17These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Table 2
Covariance matrix
1 2 3 4 5 6
1 GPA 1:00
2 Verbal SAT 0:117 1:00
3 Math SAT 0:084  0:047 1:00
4 Dictator Kept 0:127 0:122  0:189 1:00
5 Dictator Fraction Kept 0:103 0:126  0:167 0:920 1:00
6 Prosocial 0:0688 0:0989 0:162  0:363  0:479 1:00
7 Classication 0:105 0:108 0:123 0:0868 0:0537 0:144
Covariance matrix involving the central variables. Note that *** indicates
signicance at p < 0:01 and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
In addition to the obvious correlations involving Dictator Kept, Dictator Fraction Kept,
and Prosocial, we note an additional relationship. The Dictator Kept variable has a positive
correlation with GPA and a negative correlation with Math SAT. However, we note that the
Dictator Fraction Kept does not exhibit such a relationship.
3.2 Measures of Cognitive Ability and Behavior in the Dictator Game
We now examine the relationship between our measures of cognitive ability and choice in
the dictator game. We perform the following tobit regressions with a dependent variable of
Dictator Kept. These tobit regressions are performed with a lower bound of 0 and an upper
bound of 10. Regression (1) employs only our measures of cognitive ability: GPA and SAT
outcomes. Regressions (2) and (3) consider only the GPA and SAT outcomes, respectively,
along with the details of the treatment: the order of the experiment, the type of dictator
game and the interaction. Regression (4) considers all three cognitive ability measures and
the details of the treatment. Finally, regression (5) considers all three measures of cognitive
ability, the details of the treatment, and background details for the subjects. We summarize
the results in Table 3.
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Table 3
Relationship between Dictator Kept and measures of cognitive ability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 1:553 0:559   1:386 1:554
(0:678) (0:457) (0:652) (0:688)
Math SAT  0:0412    0:0370  0:0532  0:0557
(0:0205) (0:0151) (0:0196) (0:0202)
Verbal SAT 0:0228   0:0149 0:01567 0:0103
(0:0251) (0:0188) (0:0237) (0:0240)
SVO First    1:290  2:751  3:497  3:567
(0:765) (0:853) (1:094) (1:089)
Standard Dictator    1:463  2:084  2:115  1:664
(0:756) (0:791) (1:009) (1:060)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   1:096 3:277 4:237 4:151
(1:061) (1:182) (1:495) (1:495)
Female          0:403
(0:844)
Age         0:153
(0:141)
Class          0:186
(0:560)
Log likelihood  194:04  421:07  191:01  188:79  187:89
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
The tobit regressions were performed with a lower bound of 0 and an upper
bound of 10. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates
signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
We nd a relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and GPA. In
regressions (1), (4), and (5) we nd that higher GPA subjects keep more in the dictator game,
than do lower GPA subjects. We also nd a negative relationship between the amount kept
in the dictator game and Math SAT. In regressions (1), (3), (4), and (5) we nd that higher
Math SAT subjects keep less in the dictator game than do lower Math SAT subjects. Finally,
note that we do not nd a relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and
Verbal SAT.
We note the signicant relationships which are related to the details of the experiment.
As does Smith (2012), we nd that the order of the presentation of the experimental material
is related to choice. In particular, we nd that subjects who rst responded to the SVO were
13
more generous in the dictator game than subjects who responded rst to the dictator game.
We also note that the coe¢ cient involving the specication of the dictator game is signicant
in regressions (2), (3), and (4). Further, the interaction between the order and the form of
the game is signicant in regressions (3), (4), and (5).18 Finally, we note when we separately
run the regressions for both forms of the dictator game, the sign of the coe¢ cient estimates of
our measures of cognitive ability are unchanged. Although we note that in these regressions,
the coe¢ cient estimates are largely not signicant.19
While we are encouraged by the results summarized in Table 3, it is potentially problematic
that the term involving the form of the dictator game is signicant. In order to account for this
feature, we perform the analogous analysis as above. However, here the dependent variable
is the fraction kept in the dictator game and the tobit regressions are performed with a lower
bound of 0 and an upper bound of 1. We summarize the results in Table 4.
18 In contrast to Ben-Ner et al. (2004), we do not nd a signicant interaction between gender and dictator
giving.
19These results are available from the corresponding author upon request.
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Table 4
Relationship between Dictator Fraction Kept and measures of cognitive ability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 0:142 0:0670   0:154 0:169
(0:0683) (0:0461) (0:0639) (0:0671)
Math SAT  0:00366    0:00452  0:00482  0:00533
(0:00205) (0:00199) (0:00191) (0:00196)
Verbal SAT 0:00240   0:00211 0:00160 0:000969
(0:00253) (0:00241) (0:00232) (0:00234)
SVO First    0:122  0:358  0:331  0:336
(0:0770) (0:112) (0:107) (0:106)
Standard Dictator   0:0309  0:0549  0:0247 0:0274
(0:0762) (0:102) (0:0985) (0:103)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:104 0:403 0:407 0:381
(0:107) (0:153) (0:147) (0:146)
Female          0:0909
(0:0823)
Age         0:0110
(0:0138)
Class          0:0319
(0:0548)
Log likelihood  50:28  108:09  45:98  43:15  41:99
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
The tobit regressions were performed with a lower bound of 0 and an upper
bound of 1. Note that *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, ** indicates signi-
cance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
Despite the di¤erences in the dependent variables, the qualitative results presented in
Table 3 remain largely unchanged here. In particular, we note a positive relationship between
the amount kept in the dictator game and GPA, in regressions (1), (4), and (5). We also
observe a negative relationship between the amount kept in the dictator game and Math SAT,
in regressions (1), (3), (4), and (5). Finally, we do not observe a signicant relationship
between Verbal SAT and the amount kept in the dictator game.
Also similar to the results of Table 3, here we nd that the SVO First and the interaction
terms are signicant in regressions (3), (4), and (5). However, unlike the previous analysis,
here we nd that the form of the dictator game is not signicant. In our view this suggests
that the use of the Dictator Fraction Kept variable is capturing the di¤erences in behavior
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due to the di¤erent forms of the dictator game.
In summary, we observe a positive relationship between cognitive ability, as measured by
GPA, and selshness in the dictator game. We also observe a negative relationship between
cognitive ability, as measured by Math SAT, and selshness in the dictator game. Finally,
we do not observe a signicant relationship between cognitive ability, as measured by Verbal
SAT, and selshness in the dictator game.
3.3 Measures of Cognitive Ability and SVO
We now turn our attention to the relationship between the SVO measure and our measures
of cognitive ability. As such, we employ the Prosocial variable as the dependent variable.
Recall that this variable takes a value of the number of SVO questions which were answered
prosocially. In our view, this measure of generosity is most appropriate because a majority of
subjects who were not prosocial, were individualistic, rather than competitive or unclassied.
With the exception of the dependent variable, and that the analysis is conducted with binomial
logistic regressions, the analysis is identical to that summarized in Tables 3 and 4. Table 5
presents a summary of this analysis.
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Table 5
The Prosocial variable and measures of cognitive ability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 0:306 0:105   0:270 0:262
(0:129) (0:0861) (0:136) (0:146)
Math SAT 0:0137   0:0184 0:0179 0:0203
(0:00387) (0:00408) (0:00408) (0:00427)
Verbal SAT 0:0102   0:0144 0:0137 0:0142
(0:00482) (0:0050) (0:00503) (0:00519)
SVO First    0:0401 1:005 1:048 1:070
(0:141) (0:227) (0:228) (0:231)
Standard Dictator    0:292  0:2468  0:199  0:261
(0:140) (0:2015) (0:204) (0:219)
SVO First*Standard Dictator    0:328  1:026  1:014  0:903
(0:199) (0:310) (0:311) (0:315)
Female         0:421
(0:178)
Age         0:0119
(0:0302)
Class         0:0219
(0:120)
-2 log L 1045:55 2267:37 1008:65 1004:71 998:15
LR 2 24:06 32:38 55:34 58:19 62:75
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
Result of binomial logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at p <
0:01, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
First, we nd evidence of a positive relationship between GPA and social preferences
according to SVO, in regressions (1), (4), (5). In other words, higher GPA subjects are
more generous in the SVO measure. We also nd a positive relationship between Math SAT
and the social preferences according to SVO, in regressions (1), (3), (4), and (5). In other
words, higher Math SAT subjects are more generous in the SVO measure. Unlike the analysis
involving dictator behavior, we nd evidence that Verbal SAT scores are related to generosity
in the SVO. We note that higher Verbal SAT is associated with more generosity in the SVO,
in regressions (1), (3), (4), and (5). Also, unlike the analysis involving dictator behavior, we
nd that the gender variable is signicant. This suggests that women are more generous than
men, according to the SVO measure.
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3.4 Measures of Cognitive Ability and Consistency
Finally, we turn our attention to the relationship between the consistency of choices and our
measures of cognitive ability. Here we discuss the rst of our two notions of consistency.
Recall that the SVO measure consists of nine nearly identical items. As such, the number of
questions answered in a similar manner would seem to be a reasonable measure of consistency.
Therefore, we use the Classication variable as the dependent variable. Recall that this takes
the value of the maximum of the number of questions answered prosocially, individualistically,
or competitively. We perform an analysis, identical to that summarized in Table 5, with the
exception that Classication is the dependent variable. Table 6 summarizes this analysis.
Table 6
The Classication variable and measures of cognitive ability.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
GPA 0:302 0:258   0:263 0:239
(0:163) (0:118) (0:171) (0:183)
Math SAT 0:00840   0:00912 0:00859 0:00644
(0:00463) (0:00475) (0:00482) (0:00509)
Verbal SAT 0:00884   0:0113 0:00998 0:00774
(0:00578) (0:00572) (0:00583) (0:00606)
SVO First    0:0865 0:160 0:198 0:217
(0:217) (0:308) (0:309) (0:312)
Standard Dictator    0:585  0:647  0:587  0:410
(0:200) (0:258) (0:261) (0:284)
SVO First*Standard Dictator   0:542 0:242 0:254 0:0744
(0:286) (0:399) (0:399) (0:408)
Female          0:482
(0:216)
Age          0:0156
(0:0352)
Class          0:214
(0:145)
-2 log L 721:90 1349:52 714:10 711:77 704:08
LR 2 9:84 16:92 17:54 19:86 27:34
Observations 86 185 86 86 86
Result of binomial logistic regressions where *** indicates signicance at p <
0:01, ** indicates signicance at p < 0:05, and * indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
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Here we nd some evidence that GPA is related to consistency, in regressions (1) and (2).
We also nd evidence that both the Math and Verbal SAT scores are related to consistency.
However, we note that these relationships are not robust to the specication involving the
background details of the subjects.
We also consider another notion of consistency: the agreement between the SVO behavior
and the dictator game behavior. To accomplish this, we rst run two sets of regressions.
The rst set involves linear regressions with Dictator Fraction Kept as the dependent variable
and Prosocial as an independent variable. The second set involves linear regressions with the
squared residuals obtained in the rst set, with measures of cognitive ability as the independent
variables. In this way we can determine if these measures of cognitive ability are related to
the agreement between the choices on the SVO and the choice made in the dictator game.
In both regressions (1) and (2) below we use the responses on the SVO as an independent
variable and the fraction of money kept in the dictator game as the dependent variable. In
regression (1) we also include the treatment details. In regression (2) we include the treatment
details and the background details of the subjects. Table 7 summarizes these results.
Table 7
Relationship between Dictator Fraction Kept and SVO.
(1) (2)
Prosocial  0:0349  0:0357
(0:00477) (0:00480)
SVO First  0:0939  0:100
(0:0512) (0:0516)
Standard Dictator  0:00426  0:000385
(0:0507) (0:0512)
SVO First*Standard Dictator 0:0493 0:0588
(0:0716) (0:0721)
Female   0:0400
(0:0377)
Age   0:00127
(0:00353)
Class    0:0301
(0:0234)
R2 0:25 0:26
Observations 185 185
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Result of linear regressions where *** indicates signicance at p < 0:01, and *
indicates signicance at p < 0:10.
Now we use the squared residuals obtained in the regressions summarized in Table 7 as
dependent variables in the regressions summarized below. In each of the regressions below,
we use the measures of cognitive ability as independent variables in order to determine if the
agreement between SVO and dictator choices is related to our measures of cognitive ability.
In regressions (1:1), (1:2), and (1:3) below, we use the squared residuals obtained in regression
(1) as summarized in Table 7 as the dependent variables. In regressions (2:1), (2:2), and (2:3)
below, we use the squared residuals obtained in regression (2) as summarized in Table 7 as
the dependent variables. We summarize this analysis in Table 8.
Table 8
Relationship between Consistency and measures of cognitive ability.
(1:1) (1:2) (1:3) (2:1) (2:2) (2:3)
GPA  0:0248    0:0233  0:0213    0:0179
(0:0112) (0:0168) (0:0108) (0:0156)
Math SAT   0:00028 0:00034   0:00031 0:00035
(0:00050) (0:00050) (0:00046) (0:00046)
Verbal SAT    0:00087  0:00076    0:00056  0:00048
(0:00062) (0:00062) (0:00058) (0:00058)
R2 0:03 0:03 0:05 0:02 0:02 0:03
Observations 185 86 86 185 86 86
The dependent variable of the linear regressions (1:1), (1:2), and (1:3) is the
squared residuals of regression (1), as summarized in Table 7. The dependent
variable of the linear regressions (2:1), (2:2), and (2:3) is the squared residuals of
regression (2), as summarized in Table 7. Further, ** indicates signicance at
p < 0:05.
Similar to the analysis summarized in Table 6, we nd some evidence that GPA is related
to consistency. In both regressions (1:1) and (2:1) we nd that GPA is related to consistency
as measured by the agreement between SVO and dictator game choices. However, this
relationship is not robust to the specication. In particular, when we include the outcomes
on the SAT, GPA is no longer signicant. In contrast to the results summarized in Table
6, here we do not nd evidence that either the Math or Verbal SAT outcomes are related to
consistency.
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Here we have considered two notions of consistency: the coherence of the SVO behavior
and the relationship between our two measures of social preferences. We nd evidence that
GPA is related to both measures of consistency. Additionally, we nd evidence that the rst
measure is related to SAT outcomes, however, we do not nd a relationship involving the
second measure of consistency.
4 Discussion and Conclusions
Increasingly in economics, researchers are interested in examining the relationship between
cognitive ability and economic behavior. However, before researchers can make accurate
inferences of such behavior given measures of cognitive ability, we must have a better under-
standing of other relevant correlates of cognitive ability. As such, in this paper we examine
the relationship between consequential measures of cognitive ability and social preferences.
We nd that our measures of cognitive ability are related to social preferences. In partic-
ular, we nd evidence of a negative relationship between performance on the Math portion of
the SAT and selshness in both the dictator game and the SVO measure. By contrast, we
nd a positive relationship between GPA and selshness in the dictator game, but a negative
relationship between GPA and selshness on the SVO measure. Finally, we only nd some
evidence of a relationship between our measures of cognitive ability and the consistency of
choices.
To the extent that GPA is a¤ected by both cognitive ability and intrinsic motivation, as
evidence suggests that it is for unincentivized cognitive tests, then our results regarding GPA
and generosity closely resemble that found in the literature (Brandstätter and Güth, 2002;
Ben-Ner et al., 2004; Benjamin et al., 2012; Millet and Dewitte, 2007). In this sense, we view
our results as o¤ering a complementary view of the e¤ects of cognitive tests which are a¤ected
by heterogenous intrinsic motivation. However, to our knowledge, our results regarding SAT
outcomes are novel. We interpret our results involving SAT outcomes and social preferences
as suggesting that higher measures of cognitive ability, when the measures are not signicantly
related to the intrinsic motivation of the subject, are associated with more generous behavior.
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We also note that we only nd mixed evidence of a relationship between gender and social
preferences. While we nd that generosity in the SVO is related to the gender of the subject,
we do not nd such a relationship in the dictator allocations. Previous work has found a
relationship between gender and social preferences,20 however our data only provides mixed
evidence for this.
While we are encouraged by our results, there is more to be explored. For instance,
additional data is needed in order to better identify the relative merits of the measures of
cognitive ability which we use. We are also aware of the limitations of the measures of
social preferences which we use. One way to remedy this would be to conduct a thorough
investigation of social preferences, ala Charness and Rabin (2002), when considering such
consequential measures of cognitive ability.
20For instance, see Eckel and Grossman (1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (2001), Ben-Ner et al. (2004).
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Appendix A
Standard Dictator Game
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Appendix B
Nonstandard Dictator Game
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Appendix C
Social Value Orientation (SVO)
 We asked the following 9 items (from Van Lange et al., 1997) in order to measure the
SVO of the subjects.
 Each of the 9 items has a prosocial answer, a individualistic answer and a competitive
answer.
 Each item is stated in terms of points where 100 points corresponded to $0.02103.
Question 1 A B C
You: 480 points 540 points 480 points
Other1: 80 points 280 points 480 points
Question 2 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 100 points
Question 3 A B C
You: 520 points 520 points 580 points
Other1: 520 points 120 points 320 points
Question 4 A B C
You: 500 points 560 points 490 points
Other1: 100 points 300 points 490 points
Question 5 A B C
You: 560 points 500 points 490 points
Other1: 300 points 500 points 90 points
Question 6 A B C
You: 500 points 500 points 570 points
Other1: 500 points 100 points 300 points
Question 7 A B C
You: 510 points 560 points 510 points
Other1: 510 points 300 points 110 points
Question 8 A B C
You: 550 points 500 points 500 points
Other1: 300 points 100 points 500 points
Question 9 A B C
You: 480 points 490 points 540 points
Other1: 100 points 490 points 300 points
 The individualistic answers are: 1B, 2A, 3C, 4B, 5A, 6C, 7B, 8A and 9C.
 The prosocial answers are: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4C, 5B, 6A, 7A, 8C and 9B.
 The competitive answers are: 1A, 2C, 3B, 4A, 5C, 6B, 7C, 8B and 9A.
 Van Lange et al. classies a subject according to the above labels if six or more items
are selected in a similar fashion.
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